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Recent Decisions
Conflict Of Laws - A Maryland Divorce Decree Based
On Finding Of Lack Of Bona Fide Domicile In Prior Nevada
Default Decree Not Entitled To Full Faith And Credit In
Nevada. Colby v. Colby, ...... Nev. Sup. Ct ....... , 369 P. 2d
1019 (1962). Defendant wife was granted a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii by default decree in Nevada in 1955.
Plaintiff husband was granted a divorce a mensa et thoro
in 1957 by a circuit court of Maryland. Defendant appeared
personally in the Maryland proceeding and pleaded the
Nevada default decree as a defense. The Maryland court,
after finding that the wife had not established a bona fide
domicile in Nevada, declared the Nevada decree null and
void due to lack of jurisdiction and handed down its own
divorce decree. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed
this ruling, 217 Md. 35, 141 A. 2d 506 (1958). Plaintiff then
commenced this action in Nevada to set aside that state's
prior default decree. The Nevada Supreme Court held that
the Maryland decree was not entitled to full faith and
credit, and that in Nevada the 1955 default decree, being
lawfully entered, was the final determination of the marital
status of the parties in Nevada.
In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), the
leading case in this area, the court did not definitely deter-
mine the status of a prior default decree in the state where
it was entered. The Nevada court, however, relying on
strong dicta in that case, said in effect that the Maryland
Court of Appeals had no authority to decide for the state
of Nevada on what basis it may or may not grant divorces,
and further, that the question of domicile in Nevada was
one on which the state of Nevada had complete authority.
For further reference see, GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d
ed. 1949) § 127; 8 M.L.E. Divorce, § 172; 28 A.L.R. 2d 1303
(1953); Husserl, Some Reflections on Williams v. North
Carolina II, 32 Va. L. Rev. 555, 980 (1946); Powell, And
Repent at Leisure, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930 (1945); Strahorn
and Reiblich, The Haddock Case overruled - The Future
of Interstate Divorce, 7 Md. L. Rev. 29 (1942).
Constitutional Law - Blanket Exemption In Blue Laws
Not Violative Of Establishment Of Religion Clause In First
Amendment. Commonwealth v. Arlan's Department Store
of Louisville, ...... Ky ....... 357 S.W. 2d 708 (1962). Ap-
pellants were convicted in quarterly court for violation of
the Kentucky Sunday Closing Laws which, in substance,
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prohibit all work or employment on Sunday with limited
exceptions, and include a blanket exemption for "[p] ersons
who are members of a religious society which observes as
a Sabbath any other day in the week than Sunday ... if
they observe as a Sabbath one day in each seven." KEN-
TUCKY REvIsED STATUTES (1955) 436:160. On appeal the
Circuit Court held that the statute violated state and fed-
eral constitutional prohibitions against the establishment
of religion. The decision in the Circuit Court was prior to
four recent Supreme Court decisions upholding the validity
of Blue Law Statutes in Maryland, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania in the cases of McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617(1961); and Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In
these decisions the Court examined the history of Blue
Law legislation and concluded that although originally
incorporated into law for religious purposes, these acts are
now primarily of secular importance, enacted to preserve
the public health by a mandatory day of rest, and that
their aid to some religions and possible hardship on others(when containing no exception for those which have a dif-
ferent day of rest) is only incidental. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals reversed, and held that the blanket exemption,
for persons observing a Sabbath other than Sunday, is not
unconstitutional as establishing religion, discriminating
against those who celebrate the Sabbath on Sunday.
Although citing no cases directly in point, the Court
cited dicta in Braunfield v. Brown, supra, pp. 608-609, where
the majority of the Supreme Court recognized that such
exemptions may well be a wise solution to the increased
litigation claiming economic unfairness or the establish-
ment of religion as inherent results of the Blue Laws. The
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan fully
supports such a solution, and strongly questions the ma-jority's concern that enforcement of this exemption would
prove too great a hardship. Of the thirty-three states where
Sunday Closing Laws are currently in force, twenty-one
have special exemptions. Some of these are "blanket ex-
emptions" as in Kentucky (see Appendix II to Opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in McGowan v. Maryland, supra,
pp. 551-560). Several states have "limited exemptions" for
persons who observe another day as the Sabbath. See e.g.,
2A N.J.S.A. (1953) § 171-4; N.Y. Penal Law, § 2144. Mary-
land is among those states allowing no exemption to their
Sunday Closing Laws for persons keeping another day as
the Sabbath. See, 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §§ 492-534.
Criminal Law - Assault - Mistaken Although Reason-
able Belief That Another Is Being Assaulted Is Not A De-
fense To An Assault. People v. Young, 11 N.Y. 2d 274, 183
N.E. 2d 319 (1962). Defendant was convicted of third de-
gree statutory assault. Evidence showed that defendant
had attacked two plainclothes policemen attempting to
arrest an 18 year old youth. Defendant testified that he did
not know that the two men were policemen; that the youth
had his pants nearly torn off and was crying; and that, with-
out inquiring into the circumstances, he attempted to sep-
arate the two men from the youth. Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, of New York reversed the conviction, holding
that one is not criminally responsible for a third degree
assault when he goes to the aid of another who he mis-
takenly, but reasonably, believes is being unlawfully at-
tacked. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed (5-2),
holding that a mistaken though reasonable belief is no
justification for a third degree assault: (The Court rea-
soned that in a conviction of assault, unlike a case where
the felony charged requires a specific intent, requires only
a showing that the defendant knowingly struck the blow
and; that motive or mistake of fact, therefore, is not ma-
terial.) The dissent felt that an assault requires mens rea
and, therefore, a reasonable mistake would be a defense.
As in the instant case, the courts are split between the
view that a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to the
crime of assault, Brannin v. State, 221 Ind. 123, 46 N.E. 2d
599 (1943); State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A.
2d 506 (1961) (assault with a deadly weapon); Kees v.
State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 543, 72 S.W. 855 (1903); and the view
that one who goes to the aid of another does so at his peril
and is in the same position as the person defended. Com-
monwealth v. Hounchell, 280 Ky. 217, 132 S.W. 2d 921
(1939). The position adopted by the Maryland Court of
Appeals is unclear; however, the implication is that Mary-
land limits the reasonable mistake defense to a family
relationship or close association to the party defended. See
Guerriero v. State, 213 Md. 545, 550, 132 A. 2d 466 (1957);
2 M.L.E. 556, Assault and Battery, § 32. While the Guer-
riero case can be read as implying a defense where the
accused acts reasonably, the Maryland Law Encyclopedia
does not go beyond the proposition that he is protected if
the person aided would have been privileged to act as the
accused did. If this is the position of the Maryland Court
of Appeals, then, as in the instant case, one who intervenes
to protect a stranger would probably do so at his peril.
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"This emasculates the privilege of protection of much of
its content, introducing a liability without fault which is
indefensible in principle." A.L.I., Model Penal Code, Ten-
tative Draft No. 8 (1958) § 3.05, comment 1, p. 32. For
further information see, ANDERSON, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957) § 352, p. 705; PERKINS, CRIM-
INAL LAW (1957) pp. 825 et. seq., 910-911; 4 Am Jur. 155,
Assault and Battery, § 54; 6 C.J.S. 950, Assault and Battery,
§ 93; A.L.I., Model Penal Code § 3.05(1) (Tent. Draft No.
8,1958).
Criminal Law - "Mental Disease Or Defect" Under
Durham Rule Defined. MacDonald v. United States, ...... F.
2d ...... (D.C. Cir. 1962). Eight years after it pronounced
its product-of-mental-disease-or-defect test in Durham v.
United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has tried to
make clear what it means by mental disease or defect by
saying: "[T]he jury should be told that a mental disease
or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind
which substantially affects mental or emotional processes
and substantially impairs behavior controls." Critics of
the Durham rule have pointed out the practical difficulty
of construing the words "disease" and "defect" and in ap-
plying the term "product of" (as the language of the an-
nouncing court meant them to be interpreted). It was the
latter difficulty, primarily, that prompted the American
Law Institute to reject the Durham test and recommend
instead a test whereby a lack of "substantial capacity...
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law" would
relieve defendant of criminal responsibility. A.L.I., MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See also
Thomsen, Insanity As A Defense to Crime, 19 Md. L. Rev.
271, 287-288 (1959).
In Maryland the test used to determine insanity suffi-
cient to relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility is
still the M'Naghten rule. As adopted in Spencer v. State,
69 Md. 28, 37, 13 A. 809 (1888) that rule is that defendant
is held responsible if at the time of the offense he had
capacity and reason to enable him to distinguish between
right and wrong and understood the nature and conse-
quences of his act. The Court of Appeals declined to
abandon the M'Naghten rule in favor of a more liberal
test in Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A. 2d 502 (1955).
Whether the judicial definition in MacDonald, admittedly
broad and general, will prove to be an aid to the few
courts following the Durham rule remains to be seen. (The
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language used in the MacDonald case, supra, should be
compared with that of the Model Penal Code, supra. Query:
Whether the District of Columbia has partially retreated
and in fact more nearly follows the test suggested by the
American Law Institute.) Thus, the judicial and legis-
lative search for a more satisfactory test than either the
M'Naghten or Durham tests continues. See also U. S. v.
Currens, 290 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). Consult Md. L. Rev.,
Cumulative Index (Vols. 1-21, 1962), Criminal Law, In-
sanity, for articles discussing insanity tests. Cases are
collected in 45 A.L.R. 2d 1447 (1956).
Domestic Relations - Effect Of A Subsequent Bigamous
Marriage On An Illegitimate Child. In Re Estate of Weeast,
72 N.J. Super. 325, 178 A. 2d 113 (1962). Decedent deserted
his wife and began cohabitation with another woman. As
a result of this meritricious relationship the plaintiff was
born. Subsequently, the father obtained a Mexican "mail
order" divorce and entered a ceremonial marriage with
plaintiff's mother. The father died intestate, and plaintiff
claimed a right to share in his estate as a legitimate heir
under the New Jersey intestacy statutes, basing her claim,
inter alia, on 9 N.J.S.A. (1960) § 15-2 which reads: "Any
child ... born of a ceremonial marriage is the legitimate
child of both parents notwithstanding the marriage be
thereafter annulled or declared void." (Emphasis added.)
The County Court, granting summary judgment for de-
fendant, administrator of the estate, held that the at-
tempted "mail order" divorce was void, making the subse-
quent marriage bigamous, and since the plaintiff's birth
occurred before the ceremonial marriage, she was not "born
of the ceremonial marriage" within the meaning of the
statute.
Statutes in most states provide that children born out
of wedlock may be legitimated for purposes of inheritance
by the subsequent valid intermarriage of the parents. See
4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 46, § 6; MADDEN, PERSONS AND Do-
mEsTic RELATIONS (1931) §§ 103-104, p. 346; and see gen-
erally 4 VENIER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWS (1936) § 243.
Moreover, many statutes provide that the subsequent mar-
riage will legitimate the child for all purposes. See, 4 VER-
NiER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWS (1936) § 243; Ester, Illegiti-
mate Children and Conflict of Laws, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 163
(1961). Maryland has a statute similar to the one construed
in the Weeast case; however, the Court of Apepals has not
had the opportunity to determine whether it would apply
in a similar situation. 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 151
19621
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("Any children born of parents who have been the sub-
ject of a marriage ceremony with each other shall be
deemed to be the legitimate issue of such parents, whether
or not it is subsequently determined or can be determined,
that the marriage is, or might be, legally invalid because
of the prior marital status of one of the parents.") See also
Goodman v. Goodman, 151 Va. 42, 142 S.E. 412 (1928) where
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reached an opposite
conclusion from the instant case. For general reference
see, 4 VERNI, AMICAN FAMILY LAWS (1936) § 242 et.
seq.; 7 AM. Juxr. 666, Bastards, § 58; 84 A.L.R. 499 (1933).
Taxation - Purchase Of "Stock" By Subscribers To A
Community Television Antenna Service - Income Or
Capital? Community T.V. Association of Havre v. United
States, 203 F. Supp. 270 (D. Mont. 1962). Taxpayer cor-
poration was organized to provide T.V. signals through a
community antenna for use by subscribing residents of
Havre, Montana. Part of the funds were supplied by the
subscribers, each being required, in addition to paying a
connection and service charge, to buy one share of Class
B stock at par value of $100.00. The shares could be re-
deemed at any time by the corporation at par value; share-
holders had no vote or effective voice in management, had
only an illusory share in liquidation proceeds, received no
participation in profits and were subject to any restrictions
which the Board of Directors might prescribe. Default by
a subscriber in the payment of service or connection
charges permitted termination of his interest by the corpo-
ration without reimbursement. Although the funds re-
ceived from the sale of Class B stock were segregated and
carried on the books as investment capital, the corporation,
in its annual reports to the State of Montana, did not list
such stock as a part of corporate capital. Taxpayer con-
tended that the funds were "contributions to capital" or,
alternatively, payments received "in exchange for stock,"
and thus non-taxable in either case under the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. (1955) §§ 118(a) and 1032(a).
The District Court held that the payments in question were
for television services to be rendered and, therefore, con-
stituted taxable income to the corporation.
Similar results were reached in the cases of Warren
Television Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 TCM 1053 (1958)
and Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley v. Commissioner,
254 F. 2d 105 (3d Cir. 1958); however, the instant case is
distinguishable because there was an actual issuance of
capital stock to the subscribers. But the Court noted that
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no outside investors would have made such investments
unless they were, as here, required to do so in order to
receive the service. Supra, p. 274. For further reference
see STANLEY AND KILCULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (4th
ed. 1961) p. 48; 1 FEDERAL TAX REGULATIONS (1962)
§§ 1.118-1, 1.1032-1(a).
Torts - Pedestrian Has Right Of Way At Intersection
Controlled By Stop Sign. Folck v. Anthony, 228 Md. 73,
178 A. 2d 413 (1962). Defendant, driving his automobile
on a through highway struck plaintiff, a pedestrian cross-
ing the highway at the intersection. Erected on the corner
of the side street from which plaintiff approached the
major artery was a stop sign. The trial court denied plain-
tiff's prayer for a right of way instruction, and informed
the jury that the stop sign required plaintiff-pedestrian
to stop before proceeding to cross the through highway. In
reversing, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a stop
sign does not require a pedestrian to stop and yield the
right of way to vehicular traffic approaching on a through
highway.
As a general rule, and absent change by statute, the
rights of pedestrians and automobiles at intersections are
equal. See 2A BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE (1951) § 1272; 47 A.L.R. 595, 599 (1927). Such
statutes commonly provide that an operator must yield
the right of way to a pedestrian at an "uncontrolled inter-
section", one where traffic is not regulated by traffic con-
trol signals or a traffic officer. See 2A BLASHFIELD, CYCLO-
PEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE (1951) § 1272; 47
A.L.R. 595 (1927). That stop signs are not within the
category of traffic control signals see, Rees v. Spillane, 341
Ill. App. 647, 94 N.E. 2d 686, 692 (1950). The Maryland
statute referring to "uncontrolled intersections", however,
reads traffic control devices and, "signs" are specifically
included within the definition of "traffic control devices".
See 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 , §§ 236, 2(a) (29). More-
over, the term "traffic" embraces the word "pedestrians".
See 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 , § 2(a) (62). In view of
the statutory provisions, it would appear that the pedes-
trian in the instant case would not have had the right of
way. However, the Court was of the opinion that it was
not the intent of the legislature to require pedestrians to
stop in obedience of stop signs, supra, p. 79. For a case
holding, in the absence of a statutory definition, that "signs"
are not within the term traffic control devices, see Buch-
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anan v. Marcusen, 196 Minn. 520, 265 N.W. 319 (1936).
For further reference see BABBITT, MOTOR VEHICLE LAW
(4th ed. 1933) §§ 1799, 1800; BRUNE, MOTOR VEHIcLE LAW
OF MARYLAND (1928) §§ 20, 22; 3 M.L.E., Automobiles,
§§ 103, 175; 11 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
Book Review
One Man's Freedom. By Edward Bennett Williams.
New York. Atheneum, 1962, Pp. 344, including index. $5.95.
In his introduction to this very readable, timely and
provocative book, Eugene V. Rostow, Dean of Yale Law
School, makes the observation that, "The quality of a
civilization is largely determined by the fairness of its
criminal trials, and of its other proceedings in which
men may lose their liberty, their reputation, or their right
to pursue callings of their choice."1 Dean Rostow ac-
knowledges the author of this book to have demonstrated
that an honorable lawyer can have an exciting life repre-
senting persons accused of crime, in spite of the barriers
frequently faced by those genuinely concerned with the
healthy and orderly development of our constitutional law
of civil and criminal rights. The inclination of the public
to identify the lawyer with his client and the corruption
with which the criminal practice is sometimes infested are
very real obstacles to be encountered along the high road
chosen by Mr. Williams in his pursuit of constitutional
liberty through law.
Mr. Williams, in the early pages of his book, chronicles
the start of his legal career with a highly respected Wash-
ington firm, where he soon became disenchanted with the
law in its relation to property rights. After several years
of "representing the local streetcar company, a galaxy of
insurance companies and other corporate interests, usually
defending them against damage suits",2 the author opened
a small office of his own in Washington, where his practice
turned to problems of the law in its relationship to human
rights, resulting in his handling of cases concerned prin-
cipally with constitutional issues, and questions involving
civil liberties on both the civil and criminal sides of the
I Williams, ix.
2Id., 4.
